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ABSTRACT
Thunder in the Desert: Commercial 
Air Travel and Tourism in 
Las Vegas, 1959-2001
by
Daniel Bubb
Dr. Eugene Moehring, 
Examination Committee Chair 
Professor o f  History 
University o f  Nevada, Las Vegas
This thesis carefully examines the relationship between the commercial air travel 
and tourist industries in Las Vegas, especially highlighting their unprecedented growth in 
the second half o f the twentieth century. It not only provides an accurate historic account 
o f  both industries, but clearly delineates the dependence o f  tourism on commercial air 
service as the primary source o f  transportation to Las Vegas.
While the thesis’s overarching theme focuses on commercial air travel and 
tourism, it also contains a  set o f  subthemes, one of which highlights the symbiotic 
relationship o f the commercial air travel industry with the Strip "mega-resorts,” and the 
air charter and junket industries, such as Warren Bayley’s Hacienda Airlines (Chapter 2). 
A  second significant subtheme that the thesis explores, is the impact that airline 
deregulation had on Las Vegas, especially noting the remarkable increase in the number 
o f  air carriers providing service to Las Vegas, and the explosive growth in McCarran
iii
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Airport's passenger volume. The epilogue provides a future outlook for both industries 
in addition to summarizing all o f  the themes presented throughout the discussion.
IV
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PROLOGUE
Like the hotel and the train before it, the airplane quickly became a vital 
component o f  western tourism. Following the transition period between the Wright 
brothers’ epic flight in 1902 and the technology developed during World W ar II, the 
airline industry was bom. The nation witnessed the birth o f  the age o f  modem air travel 
in the United States when President Calvin Coolidge signed the Air Commerce Act on 
May 20, 1926. O f course it took many years before the airplane seriously rivaled the 
automobile and bus as the preferred way to travel to distant destinations, but tourists and 
business passengers recognized the former's advantages.' As an altemative to spending 
numerous hours driving in their cars or riding on uncomfortable and crowded buses, 
Americans gradually embraced airplanes as the more comfortable means to reach their 
destinations. In many parts o f rural America, like Alaska, airplanes were the only way to 
travel until modem highways finally arrived.
Even though air travel became even more popular after World War II, it 
nevertheless experienced a number o f setbacks, including lack o f airport funding. The 
reasons for this problem were numerous. First, airport constmction was expensive, 
especially for poor towns in places like the South or smaller cities with a meager tax 
base. Second, these facilities consumed large amounts o f  valuable land, which drew the 
opposition o f  local real estate developers, frequently resulting in protracted litigation as 
well as disputes over the use o f convenient domain. In addition, local residents 
complained about the noise. But, political and business leaders pushed forward with 
constmction plans, because they realized how important these projects would become to 
the local economy. While there was some constmction in larger cities during the 1920s,
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the Great Crash and subsequent depression dramatically cut back on building budgets. 
Fortunately, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, with its emphasis on relief spending, 
financed a renaissance o f  airport and highway construction through the PWA, WPA, 
FERA, CW A, and other alphabet agencies. O f  course, demand had been diminished by 
the nation’s spiraling unemployment rate. In the 1930s, many families had little 
disposable income and vacation time, which, in addition to expensive airfares, limited 
their travel plans.
Soon after the war ended, travel and tourism boomed. Record numbers o f  
passengers filled airport terminals nationwide, forcing airlines to offer more flights. 
Newer, larger, and faster aircraft transported a  more affluent traveling public to 
destinations in half the time that it usually took by automobile, bus, or train. By the 
1970s, thousands o f tourists boarded flights to cities throughout the coimtry, especially to 
resort meccas like Miami Beach, Orlando, Honolulu, and Las Vegas, which also 
benefited from this trend. In 1948, four airlines (Bonanza, Western Air Express, TWA, 
and United) transported 35,106 passengers to Las Vegas. Eleven years later, that number 
increased to a staggering 959,603." Then in the 1960s, thanks to the Simbelt boom, 
credit cards, and the democratization o f  casino gambling, Americans began flocking to 
the “resort city o f  lights” in the desert.
Before tourism became the cornerstone o f  southern Nevada’s economy. Las 
Vegas had been a small, western railroad town periodically convulsed by labor unrest. In 
1922 for instance, a Union Pacific strike paralyzed the city’s economy. It suffered a 
second blow when vengeful railroad executives moved the town’s repair yards and their 
valuable payrolls to Caliente in the mid-l920s.^ In 1929, the community revived from 
nearly a  decade o f  recession when the federal government funded construction o f  
Boulder Dam, a massive public worics project that transformed Las Vegas from a desert 
whistlestop to a vibrant tourist center.
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While America suffered in the early 1930s, southern Nevada boomed. In 1931, 
construction o f  Hoover Dam began and the project eventually required over 5.000 
employees who, with their families, temporarily contributed to southern Nevada’s 
growing economy. The dam also attracted thousands o f tourists who came from various 
regions o f  the country to wimess this massive undertaking. It continued to boost local 
coffers until 1935, when construction ended, and many o f  the workers left town. While 
tourists still flocked to the site by the thousands to see this man-made wonder. Las Vegas 
businessmen and other promoters struggled to boost tourism to offset the loss o f  
population. They tried golf toiunaments, boat races on newly-formed Lake Mead, and 
even invented the annual Helldorado Rodeo. But, it became increasingly obvious in the 
late 1930s that gambling was the answer.
In 1931, the state legislature had voted to re-legalize the pastime. Until the late 
1930s when California operators like Guy McAfee came to town, the casinos were 
mostly small operations run by local hoteliers. But, the industry grew during World War 
II when thousands o f  soldiers and defense workers flocked to Las Vegas to try their luck. 
The 1940s also wimessed the birth o f  the Strip with the opening o f  the El Rancho Vegas 
in 1941 and the Hotel Last Frontier a year later. By war’s end, Busgy Siegel was 
finishing the Fabulous Flamingo, with its luxurious carpeting, lavish chandeliers, 
spacious rooms, and premier entertainment. The Thimderbird, and later in the 1950s, the 
Desert Inn, Sands, Sahara, and myriad other resorts appeared to pose an increasing threat 
to Fremont Street in the battle for the nation’s growing number o f  toiuists. As the casino 
city’s appeal grew, so did the popularity o f  air travel, and the two eventually forged a 
symbiotic relationship that was profitable to both industries.
Prior to the 1950s, transportation played a key role in feeding tourists to these 
establishments. The automobile, bus, and train were the most popular conveyances 
delivering people to Las Vegas. Angelenos drove or rode 300 miles through the Mojave
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Desert heat to experience the unique gambler’s paradise in Las Vegas. But, in the 1950s 
and 1960s, as airlines began offering affordable fares and flew spacious, air-conditioned 
aircraft, thousands o f  tourists switched to air travel. By the 1980s and 1990s, as mega­
resorts sprouted along the Strip, and gambling gained national and international 
popularity, and as increasingly affluent Americans traveled more frequently than ever 
before, air travel surpassed all other modes o f  transportation except for the automobile.
This thesis explores the development o f  air travel and tourism in Las Vegas from 
1959 to the beginning o f  the twenty-first century. In particular, it will focus on the close 
relationship between the casino industry and airlines. Chapter 1 traces the development 
o f  McCarran International Airport, and describes its role in uniting commercial air travel 
and tourism during the 1950s, 1960s, and in later decades. Chapter 2 emphasizes the 
importance o f  charters and junket airlines as air carriers that brought a new class o f 
tourists to Las Vegas in the late 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. This trend also provided an 
opportunity for some hotels to develop a profitable addition to their resort operations. 
The third chapter focuses on the central role played by America's major commercial 
airlines as vital transportation institutions which by the 1970s, began annually delivering 
millions o f  tourists to Las Vegas. Finally, chapter four examines the explosion o f  the 
city’s tourist industry in the 1980s and especially the 1990s, and how McCarran Airport 
and the airlines adjusted to this growth, while at the same time, promoting it.
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INTRODUCTION
THE EARLY YEARS
The roots o f  aviation in Las Vegas lie deep in the city’s past. Less than two 
decades after the Wright Brothers’ inaugural flight, local residents discussed the 
possibility o f  building an airport to supplement their train station and the approaching 
highway from San Bernardino. On Thanksgiving Day, 1920, local resident Robert 
Hausler (a former army pilot) opened Anderson Field (the field was on the Anderson 
family’s property) soon after the first recorded plane landed in town.' Anderson Field 
lay just three miles south o f  Las Vegas, and consisted o f  one graded dirt landing strip, 
and a water tank (today located approximately in the Sahara and Las Vegas Hilton 
parking lots)." This primitive airport had been used by local and military pilots until 
1926, when Western Air Express began scheduled passenger service to Las Vegas.
Events moved quickly once brothers Leon and Earl Rockwell purchased the field 
from Hausler in April, 1926 (renaming it Rockwell Field). Just one month after the deal, 
the first Western Air Express Douglas M-2 mail carrier landed there. The airline’s 
founder, Harris M. “Pop” Hanshue, a  former automobile dealer in Los Angeles, had 
created the company in 1925 to exploit a lucrative federal government airmail contract 
(Civil Air Mail Route #4) transporting mail from Los Angeles to Salt Lake City with Las 
Vegas as a fuel stop.^ The city’s location was ideal, because it enjoyed favorable weather 
and provided a safe place for an airstrip where pilots could takeoff and land. Though 
Western Air Express primarily flew mail, it was not long before the company began 
carrying passengers. On May 23, 1926, Ben Redman and J.A. Thompson were the 
first passengers to fly on the airline.^
6
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While city residents welcomed the Rockwells’ airport in 1926, finding private 
funds to upgrade and maintain it became increasingly difficult. In 1928, the brothers 
leased the field to the city for one year, and after the lease expired, they sold the airport.® 
Coincidentally at that time in 1928, P A . “Pop” Simon, a local businessman, had been 
developing an airport eight miles northeast o f  Las Vegas as a base for Nevada Air Lines, 
which promised to offer daily flights between Las Vegas and Reno. But the deal 
collapsed, leaving Simon with an airport and a  few general aviation tenants.^
While searching for a new airport, Hanshue decided it would be more economical 
for his airline to operate out o f a company-owned field than to rent private facilities.
Thus, he struck a deal with Simon in November 1929, agreeing to lease the airfield for 20 
years. By 1932, Rockwell Field had become an insignificant small facility for general 
aviation pilots while Western Air Express Field emerged as the city’s main airport.^
Vem Willis, a ticket agent and station manager for the airline in 1940, 
remembered that the facility had a terminal “that was 20 feet by 40 feet, containing a 
coffee shop, some small offices, a radio room, a ticket counter, and a weather station in 
an adjoining building with a water tower on its roof.”  ̂ It also contained eight or nine slot 
machines that often brought in more revenue than airline ticket sales. In fact, the 
terminal’s gambling revenues were so high that airline personnel “had to empty them 
three or four times a day.”’ With Western Air Express offering four daily flights between 
Los Angeles and Salt Lake City, and with other commercial airlines entering the market, 
and flying larger aircraft such as DC-3s and Constellations, airport expansion became 
critical. In the late 1930s, the ciw, with financial support from Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
tried to buy the facility, but Western Air Express blocked the deal.'®
A few years later, war accomplished what negotiators failed. Following the 
outbreak o f  war in Europe, the United States army had been searching for a  gunnery field 
to train its pilots for the war. On October 5, 1940, the city o f  Las Vegas agreed to lease 
the field to the Army Air Corps, resulting in an airport for joint military/civilian use. On
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January 25,1941, the Air Corps signed a lease extension and received $340,000 firom the 
Civil Aeronautics Board for improvements that included one 4,000 foot-long, east-west 
runway, a 5,900 foot-long, north-south runway, as well as a third landing strip, grading, 
drainage, and hangars."
The town also gained another field during the war. In 1942, George Crockett, an 
aviation enthusiast from Unionsville, Missouri, arrived in town seeking land for a dirt 
airstrip, his flight school, and air tour business he intended to open. Crockett expressed 
interest in purchasing Western Air Express Field, but quickly changed his mind when he 
discovered that it cost $500 per acre. He leased 640 acres south o f  town off the Los 
Angeles Highway (today the Strip) from the Department o f  Interior at a rate o f  $10 a  year 
for 20 years. Because the government offered lucrative contracts to flight schools to train 
pilots for the war, Crockett leased $35,000 worth o f machinery including eight airplanes, 
aircraft tools, and other equipment from Sioux Skyways, a commercial air carrier (going 
out o f  business) in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. But in order to receive a Civilian Pilot 
Training (CPT) contract from the government, he needed a hangar. Because he did not 
have enough money to pay for a hangar, he had to sell three airplanes and borrow 
$4,500.'-
Crockett literally built his airport from scratch. He spent days grading the 
airport’s gravel nmways and struck a deal with a contractor and purchased an old 
construction shack for $1,800, in addition to three adobe walls and second-hand lumber 
for building a  terminal and hangar. He also had a well filled with water, but nothing to 
use as a  pump until he acquired an old diesel engine for $1,200 to pump running water. 
Also, a gas company gave him an old Texaco truck to be used for fueling airplanes.'®
On January 1, 1943, he inaugurated Alamo Field, an airport consisting o f three runways, 
a terminal building, flight school, rental car business (U-Drive it cars), a  motel (the 
Beacon Inn), and a  complimentary shuttle service to town for pilots.'^ Despite
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Crockett’s intention o f  building a facility for primarily general aviation, the field quickly 
became one that would serve all commercial airlines.
In 1946, the army closed its training base and ended its partnership with Clark 
County. But, in 1947, as the Cold War escalated, the newly-created United States Air 
Force, with the support o f  Senator Pat McCarran, aimounced its intention o f  establishing 
a permanent base at the old site. The stumbling block o f  course, was the need to share 
runways with commercial flights. Following a series o f discussions with Pentagon 
officials and McCarran, local and political business leaders decided that air force payrolls 
and supply orders dictated that the county build its own public airport. Clearly, the 
airlines supported this move. Throughout the war. Western Airlines (Western Air 
Express became Western Airlines in March 1941 just one month after Western Air 
Express Field was renamed McCarran Field), TWA, Bonanza, and United had 
complained about how military traffic gave them little space to operate. So, to please 
both the air force and commercial carriers, the Clark County Board o f  Commissioners, in 
consulting with the City Commissioners, entered into agreement with Crockett to 
purchase his airport for S I23,000.'® In addition to the sale, the county also included in 
the contract, a thirty year lease for him to remain on the field as a fixed base operator. 
After completion o f the deal in 1948, all commercial airlines relocated to Alamo Field 
while the air force continued operating out o f its base, which, in 1951, was re-named 
Nellis Air Force Base. To be sure, preparing Alamo Field for commercial operations was 
expensive. In addition to $850,000 in federal airport funds to help finance the $1.5 
million needed for the project, the county proposed a $750,000 bond issue.'® Despite 
opposition fi'om some local residents, the bond issue passed. On December 19, 1948, the 
county renamed Alamo Field for Senator Pat McCarran, who had not only helped to 
secure this facility, but also the original army gunnery base, and the Basic Magnesium 
defense factory in  what became Henderson.'^
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From the outset, the new airport was clearly inadequate for the increasing 
passenger volume and air traffic in Las Vegas. Only a year after its opening, commercial 
airlines carried 42,724 passengers, a number far exceeding what the relatively small 
facility could handle.'* Even though the airport possessed three paved runways that were 
night lit, an air traffic control tower, and a weather station, it was simply too small for the 
number and size o f aircraft operating there daily. As more hotel construction boosted air 
travel, pressure mounted on airport officials to expand their facility. As the Sands, 
Sahara, and other plush resorts appeared on the Strip in the 1950s, passenger volume 
continued to soar at McCarran. In fact, by 1955, nearly half a million passengers walked 
through the airport’s gates, forcing airport manager John Metten and his planning staff to 
draw up plans for expanded runways, taxi ways, and terminal facilities. By 1959, the 
crunch was so great that Metten and county officials decided that their only recourse was 
to build a new and much larger public airport off Paradise Road.
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CHAPTER I 
A NEW AIRPORT IS BORN
In the late 1950s, increased air traffic and terminal congestion caused by tourist 
growth in Las Vegas left airport officials with few options. The county had already spent 
well over one million dollars grading and paving ramps, repairing runways and taxiways, 
and combating passenger congestion. Over $600,000 had been spent on runway 
extension and lighting alone. By the end o f  1959, the airport handled 959,603 passengers 
and 99 flights per day.' These figures led County Commissioner Clesse Turner to 
conclude that “the combination o f lack o f space to accommodate je ts and a bad airport 
location, made it prohibitive to enlarge the present [terminal] building.”  ̂ Review -Joum al 
editor A1 Cahlan pointed out the need for a new facility by claiming that “the present 
facilities are completely unfit for the class o f  people we are getting to come to Las Vegas 
and the increasing number o f  airlines serving this community have brought obsolescence 
so far as accommodations are concerned.”® Passenger growth was simply overwhelming. 
Cahlan argued that “since the airport was constructed, air travel into Las Vegas has 
mushroomed to a  point where, this year, it is probable that traffic will reach the one 
million per year mark.” Expansion was thus essential to Las Vegas’ future.^ He pointed 
out that “in the next ten years, practically every major airline will have changed over to 
jets. .. The feeder lines, will have to convert to some sort o f  turboprops.... When that time 
comes, a ir traffic will soar tremendously. ”® His prediction was correct.
In 1959, the introduction o f  jet aircraft completely transformed the air travel 
industry and forced Claric County to build a larger facility. For three decades prior to the
12
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1959 delivery o f  the Boeing 720B, 707, and the Douglas DC-8 to airlines, passengers had 
to travel on slow, noisy, propeller-driven aircraft® Although these airplanes were 
certainly faster than automobiles, trains, or boats, they still took hours, with all the fuel 
stops, to deliver passengers to their destinations. The turbojet shortened travel time and 
allowed passengers to extend their vacations. Anthony Sampson, author o f Em pires o f  
the Shy: Politics, C ontests, and C artels o f  W orld A irlines, explained how “the je t 
transformed the entire economics and sociology o f  air transportation, making travel not 
only faster, but more reliable and cheaper, opening it up to a mass market.”  ̂ Obviously, 
airlines and casino executives could hardly wait for the arrival o f  these planes.
Airport managers, however, were not as enthusiastic. McCarran Airport Director 
Gordon Miles remembered when the United Airlines Boeing 720B first landed at the 
airport in February 1960. Company officials invited Miles onboard for a tour o f the 
plane’s spacious and luxurious interior and took him on a brief flight over part o f  the 
Grand Canyon. He recalled how it turned out to be a “bit o f  a circus,” because McCarran 
Airport had not yet been equipped to accommodate such a large and heavy aircraft*
With more jets forecast to serve Las Vegas, the airport had to reinforce runway pavement 
(for weight), and extend runway lengths because jets needed longer takeoff distances, 
especially on hot afternoons due to reduced engine output and lift. The airport also had 
to widen taxiways, expand terminal space, and enlarge the gates. In August 1960, United 
advertised “first class and custom coach” non-stop je t service from New York and 
(Chicago to Las Vegas.”’ But the new planes did not alleviate McCarran’s air traffic and 
terminal congestion problems; they only added to them. Still, the advent o f je t service in
1960 increased community support for airport expansion and the bond issue.
According to new airport plans, the dome-shaped facility, when finished, would 
consist o f  two-two story buildings. The first would contain airline ticket counters, 
offices, and baggage carousels. The second, a 90,000 square foot hexagonal-shaped 
satellite structure, would house a  restaurant, cocktail lounge, shops, a nursery.
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concessions, and 16 gates for jet aircraft with provisions for enlargement to 
accommodate 24 aircraft” '® The ground floor o f  both buildings would contain airline 
sales counters, a baggage claim area, car rental counters, a newsstand, and a barbershop. 
As an added feature for passengers and taxi and bus drivers, a large canopy provided 
shade by covering the front entrance o f the main terminal." Airport planners and 
developers also wanted to build an air traffic control tower with the most advanced radio, 
radar, and tele communications equipment, a fire station at the base o f the tower, and a 
parking structure with 1,400 automobile spaces.'® To implement these plans, airport 
planners and officials asked voters to pass a crucial SS million bond issue for airport 
expansion.
Initially, the bond issue had few supporters. Boosters were concerned that voters 
would not approve it because a $6 million issue for local schools had already been 
passed, and the likelihood o f  voters approving the allocation o f  more taxpayer dollars for 
airport expansion was doubtful. Airport manager Gordon Miles even noted the 
opposition o f  many resort casino executives to the move, because “when the airport was 
on the west side, all hotels felt that they had a decent shot at the tourists. .. With the new 
location, some o f  the operators felt that the traffic would be diverted away from their 
hotels.” '® In fact, some casino owners on the south end o f  the Strip demanded that the 
county pave Bond Road (today Tropicana Avenue) from the airport directly to their part 
o f  the Strip. One concemed hotel owner even argued that “any move that would divert 
traffic fix)m [our end o f  the] Strip would certainly be detrimental to our entire 
economy.” ''*
On the eve o f  the vote, these casino owners held a meeting to discuss how to 
pressure the county into building Bond Road. County engineers responded that 
construction o f  such a  road would be useless because the Strip was already overcrowded 
and a new road would only add to the congestion. Coimty Commission Chairman Harley 
Harmon, a Las Vegas resident him self contended that appropriating $50,000 for a one­
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way highway out o f airport parking connecting to the south end o f  the Strip was a waste 
o f  money. Having realized that the county rejected their argument, the casino owners 
backed away. But in the early 1960s, after much political maneuvering, they received 
their road.
The casino owners were not the only ones who expressed opposition to the 
proposed new airport. Some local residents vociferously objected to the entire project, 
calling it “a white elephant basking in the sun.” '® However, despite opposition from 
some tax-weary residents and many casino executives, on March 17, 1960, the bond issue 
passed.
Voters’ approval for construction o f the new airport could not have come at a 
better time. McCarran officials knew that after consolidating all o f  the commercial 
airlines at Alamo Field, the annual passenger volume would skyrocket, and thus fuel the 
need for further expansion. Just a few days before voters voted on the bond issue, the 
Las Vegas Chamber o f Commerce overwhelmingly supported the measure by a vote o f 
12 to 1 (the one who voted against the measure owned a hotel). One member justified his 
vote for expansion by claiming that ’th e  increase o f  Las Vegas air travel is dependent on 
the construction o f a new terminal building and other improvements at McCarran 
Field.” '® Another argued that expansion was vital t o  keep up with the je t age o f  
transportation.” ' ®
Even County Commissioners were convinced that they made the right decision by 
moving the airport to Paradise Road. Despite the expense, they knew that Las Vegas 
needed a new facility to accommodate mushrooming tourists and je t aircraft. The new 
McCarran would do that. According to chief architect John Replogle o f  Welton, Becket 
& Associates, “the new McCarran facilities have been designed for the convenience o f 
the jet-age air traveler.... We have tried to provide [him] as efficient service on the 
ground as he usually receives in the air.” '*
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The major problem that county commissioners faced was the cost, especially in a 
city and state where taxpayers were known for their parsimony. Everyone knew that 
construction o f  the new airport and improvements to the old one would be expensive. In 
a  1957 airport study, airport planning and developer Leigh Fisher & Associates had 
estimated that a new facility would cost $3,865,000. Further expansion o f the existing 
facility, they claimed, would easily exceed $2.5 million.”  The study even warned that 
•'expansion o f  existing facilities would be limited by space at the current site.”®® Alamo 
Field would gain 12 gates, however, there would be no additional room for further 
expansion.
After voters approved the crucial bond issue, construction began immediately. 
Contractors lengthened runways, widened taxiways, and enlarged the terminal for general 
aviation and charter aircraft (this was for McCarran Airport located at the old Alamo 
Field). They also built a new jetport, runways, taxiways, and a ramp at the new location 
(today Paradise Road and Russell Road) only for commercial airline use. The new 
McCarran Airport opened on March 15, 1963.
When workers completed construction of the latter, the cost was far more than 
they originally projected, $4.5 million (not including the cost o f  improvements at the old 
airport).®' The airport also had to purchase $1.25 million worth o f  land for future 
development.®® County Commissioner Harley Harmon informed residents that federal 
airport funding would pay for a majority o f the expense but the rest had to be borne by 
the taxpayers.
In its first year, the new airport handled over 1.5 million passengers and averaged 
128 flights a day. Six airlines served McCarran including Pacific Airlines and Delta. In 
1967, the passenger volume doubled, and more je t aircraft appeared at the gates. After 
four years o f  operation. Las Vegas was booming. Caesars Palace opened in 1966, and 
Kirk Kerkorian’s plans for the enormous International Hotel (later the Las Vegas Hilton) 
promised to inundate the Strip with even more visitors. So, after only four years o f
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operation, McCarran was already inadequate. As a result. Airport Manager Earl Taylor 
(who replaced Gordon Miles in 1965), and his staff began planning for further expansion. 
Their plan called for doubling the size o f the terminals, lengthening the runways, 
widening the taxiways, and adding 36 more gates.®^
In 1968, the Boeing 727’s arrival demonstrated why the airport had to be 
expanded. With a  seating capacity for 155 people (far more than the maximum capacity 
o f  any propeller driven aircraft) and a gross landing weight o f  188,000 pounds, it became 
the most popular commercial jet (replacing many smaller aircraft) at McCarran. By 
decade’s end, wide-bodies made their appearance in Las Vegas. In 1969, a Boeing 747 
test airplane landed at the airport, inaugurating the arrival o f  still another je t age.
Completion o f the expansion project in 1974 (which began in 1968) carried with 
it a hefty price tag o f $30 million. This time, county commissioners found a new funding 
source to avoid antagonizing local residents every time the airport needed addition 
facilities. Bonds were sold that cost the taxpayers nothing. As early as 1966, the airport 
was finally able to pay for its own expenses, because it made a tremendous profit by 
leasing the gates, ticket counters, and baggage carousels to commercial airlines, as well 
as terminal space to concessions (slot machines also brought in significant revenue).
This was essential because the metropolitan area’s population base was still relatively 
small at that time (about 100,000 people), making it difficult for the county to rely on 
taxpayers as an additional source o f  funding for expensive airport projects. The airport 
had to support itself, and it largely did.
But, as the passenger volume continued to soar, it quickly became clear that even 
the $30 million expansion project was inadequate. Residents and journalists criticized 
the new airport for still being too small. They argued that increased airport air traffic 
would only contribute further to the terminal congestion. They were right. With the 
passenger volume expected to easily reach ten million by 1980, Taylor and his staff hired 
Landrum &  Brown (in 1972), a consulting firm to design plans to alleviate McCarran’s
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traffic problem for the next two decades. In its 1976 executive summary, the firm urged 
the airport to immediately purchase 3,000 more acres o f land for further runway 
extension, more taxiways, and a strengthened apron for heavy jets (at the new airport). It 
also recommended that the airport acquire additional property for construction o f  a  new 
terminal, runways, and taxiways for general aviation and charter operators (at the old 
airport).-^
In 1976, Taylor hired TRA, another airport consulting company, to conduct a 
study. In its 1979 executive summary, the firm recommended construction o f  a third 
runway at the new airport, terminal expansion to include three satellites, and a people - 
mover system.'^ Planners for TRA and Landrum & Brown clearly recognized the need 
for immediate expansion. As one report asserted, “the terminal building is now burdened 
with more passengers and airplanes than it can comfortably accommodate ... Every part 
o f  the facility is overcrowded, from ticketing and baggage areas to coffee shops and 
restrooms.”*̂  Both studies also predicted that by 1995, “passenger loads would exceed 
30 million and the number o f commercial aircraft seeking to use the airfield would more 
than double.’*"̂  TRA won the contract and began construction in 1980.
After protracted discussion, the county commissioners voted in 1979 to begin 
work in 1980 on “McCarran 2000,” a multi-phase process designed to equip Las Vegas 
with a large enough airport to handle 20 million tourists by the end o f the century. Phase 
I o f  the new “McCarran 2000” masterplan called for the construction o f a  new parking 
facility, an automated transit system for passengers, a new crash/fire/rescue building, a 
new air traffic control tower, and upgraded facilities. Phases two and three included 
terminal expansion, still more gates, another parking garage, new taxiways, satellite 
buildings for international arrivals, and lengthened runways, as well as a third runway.^*
Obtaining funds for this enormous project was not easy. Completion o f  the first 
phase cost a staggering $278 million. As a  result, airport management and county 
officials struggled to sell enough bonds to cover the cost. But they had, because the
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projects were essential to modernizing the facility . For example, since the airport utilities 
were antiquated and operated well beyond their capacity, officials had to build a new 
tunnel for the facility’s expanded infrastructure. John Solomon, McCarran Airport 
Aviation Director, explained how it took several years for contractors to "construct a new 
tunnel to access power lines for heating and cooling systems, a water system, sewer and 
gas lines, as well as communication lines.” ’̂ Though work was supposed to begin in 
1982, the results o f the 1978 federal deregulation o f  the airline industry brought so many 
new carriers to Las Vegas so quickly, that it forced the airport to start sooner.
Deregulation brought added traffic, despite the drag created by New Jersey’s 
legalization o f  gaming in Atlantic City in that same year. In 1980, Las Vegas’ passenger 
volume exceeded ten million. Airport expansion continued and in 1985, the airport 
completed Phase I. Robert Broadbent replaced Solomon as Airport Director in the 
following year, and oversaw the commencement and completion o f Phase II. By 1990, 
the “C’* gates had been built to help accommodate Southwest Airlines’ rapid expansion 
o f service. Plans immediately went forward to implement Phase III, which included “D” 
gates (completed two years ahead o f  schedule in 1998. adding 28 more gates), more 
parking (a $77 million, nine story structure), a second air terminal for international and 
charter flights (a $35 million, 183.000 square-foot facility with eight gates), and new 
executive terminals for Signature Flight Support. Eagle Canyon Airlines, and other 
corporate and air tour operators. Ambitious officials also planned to extend the three 
existing runways, and construction o f a fourth with a full instrument approach and 
lighting system (built in 1991, costing the airport $81 million)
Work was completed on these projects just in time, because over 33 million 
people passed through McCarran International Airport before century’s end. And 
forecasters see the number surging higher as Las Vegas surpasses Mecca, the world’s 
leading tourist destination. Indeed, the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor Authority 
expects that number to increase to 55 million by 2012. By that time, the airport’s 98
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gates will be unable to accommodate the proposed increase in air traffic. According to 
planners, realistically, 120 to 125 are needed.^'
As the twenty-first century dawned, McCarran International Airport had become 
the vital link between commercial air travel and tourism in Las Vegas. It provided the 
necessary means to ensure a continuous flow o f vacationers coming to the city. Because 
the passenger volume rose — at times almost exponentially between the 1940s and the 
1990s — airport expansion became crucial to the city’s future economy. As early as 
1979, the study by TRA pointed out how “air traffic in Clark County multiplied at a far 
greater rate than the national average... This traffic represents economic vitality to the 
Las Vegas community... and it will be to the advantage o f  the entire county to cultivate 
and facilitate the increase.” "̂ Therefore, as tourism continued to grow, McCarran 
International Airport played a greater role in an era when commercial air travel finally 
became the preferred means o f transportation for many Americans.
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CHAPTER 2
FIRST CLASS JUNKET AIRLINES 
FOR COACH CLASS TRAVELERS
When we think o f  tourists flying to Las Vegas, Reno, and other casino cities 
today, we normally think o f  passengers deplaning o ff a regularly scheduled flight which 
they booked for the standard fare offered by American, Delta, or some other commercial 
airline for that destination. But there is another side to the air transport business, which 
for over forty years has played a significant role in the gambling business. As early as 
1959, the Las Vegas Chamber o f  Commerce reported that 151,173 passengers who flew 
to Las Vegas arrived on charters or private flights.^
These so-called “junkets” not only contributed significantly to volume in the 
passenger transportation industry, but also represented a new madceting niche for the 
hotel business. No other junket airline in Nevada epitomized this more than Warren 
“Doc” Bayley’s Hacienda Airlines, which he began in 1959 to feed tourists and gamblers 
to his Hacienda Hotel. With eight airplanes flying between Las Vegas and destinations 
in California, New Yoric, and Hawaii, and scores o f  people waiting to make reservations 
on the inexpensive flights. Hacienda Airlines quickly became the most successful junket 
carrier in Nevada.
Traditionally, junket deals were only available to high rollers. Gambling resorts 
showed little interest in offering these packages to the lower ends o f  the market. As Mark 
Skidmore pointed out in his study o f  the industry, “each junketeer was a male over the
22
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age o f  21, woddng in a profession where he earned an annual salary exceeding 
$30,000.”  ̂Skidmore also noted an additional prerequisite; each junketeer had to 
establish a minimum $2500 line o f credit with the casino. In return they received a 
complimentary hotel room, meals, beverages, and a show ticket. In B ig Ju lie o f Vegas, 
author Edward Liim provides a similar description o f  a junket in the section where he 
described a group o f  doctors, lawyers, and other professionals, who flew from New York 
to Las Vegas on a chartered United Airlines DC-8. At the casino, each o f them spent 
hundreds o f  dollars and in return, received coupons for complimentary beverages, a 
buffet, and show tickets.^ Though Skidmore and Linn argue that junkets only catered to 
wealthy customers, the two authors were unaware that a junket airline market for 
moderate and lower income travelers had already been established.
Before Hacienda Airlines even began, other junket carriers had been flying people 
to Las Vegas for almost twenty years. These junkets were popular and contributed a 
hefty increment to hotel profits, hi 1942, the Hotel Last Frontier bussed many o f its 
customers to town, but it shifted to airplanes in the following year because highway 
travel was too slow. By contracting with various air charter services in Los Angeles, the 
hotel was able to transport more people daily. William J. Moore, general manager and 
co-owner o f  the Last Frontier, negotiated an arrangement with these carriers that allowed 
him to offer his guests a package deal “at a  very reduced price” that included a room, a 
number o f  meals, and transportation to and from the airport. Customers arrived in Los 
Angeles from Detroit or Dallas on commercial airlines, and then boarded a charter plane 
operated by a local air charter service to Las Vegas.^ In a reminiscence, Moore claimed 
that the Last Frontier pioneered charter airplane promotions, and created a new niche in 
the Las Vegas travel market that “attracted a lot o f  people” to town.^
One o f  the air services in Southern California with which the Last Frontier 
contracted was Los Angeles Air Service (LAAS), owned and operated by a young 
entrepreneur named Kirk Kerkorian. His fleet consisted o f  a Douglas DC-3, a  twin-
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engine Cessna, and a single engine Beechcraft.^ Though the LAAS flew people from Los 
Angeles Municipal Aiiport to many different destinations on the West Coast, the most 
conunon was Las Vegas, where Kerkorian also did a lot o f  business with Moore. In 
1950, Kerkorian moved his operation to the Lockheed Air Terminal in Long Beach, 
where he competed with forty other junket airlines. He struggled for a while until he 
pleased his customers by upgrading his service by purchasing a four-engine Douglas C- 
54. After spending $28,000 to retrofit it and refurbish the interior, Kerkorian’s flights 
were always full.^ As a result, he quickly became a contender with the other junket 
airlines, and in the process learned a lot about the casino city he would someday help 
transform.
Despite his success, young Kerkorian never matched the success that Warren 
Bayley enjoyed with Hacienda Airlines. This carrier began in 1959 when Henry Price, 
who already was a hotel promotions staff member and owner o f  an air charter service in 
Burbank, asked Bayley if  he would be interested in flying moderate and low income 
Southern California gamblers and tourists to the Hacienda. Price explained that he 
operated weekly flights to the Showboat and Thunderbird hotels where managers 
complained about not having enough available rooms to accommodate weekend crowds. 
Bayley immediately accepted Price’s offer on condition that Price would provide flights 
on weekdays and weekends. Hacienda Hotel Manager Richard Taylor recalled Bayley 
saying that “if  32 people in Los Angeles are willing to fly to Las Vegas on a weekend, 
then there certainly must be 32 more willing to come on a weekday.”'
Bayley’s intuition proved correct. In 1959, he launched the resort’s Hacienda 
Flight Division with a fleet o f  two DC-3s, each capable o f  seating 32 passengers, one 
DC-4 for 77 passengers, and five Constellations that seated 80 passengers each. 
According to Taylor, Bayley’s flights were so popular that customers had to book their 
reservation three or four weeks in advance.’
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At the time when Bayley began his operation, the Dunes Hotel, his major 
competitor, had been providing daily junket flights for several years from Los Angeles, 
Long Beach, and Burbank with a single DC-3. One $24.95 ticket entitled a guest to a 
tour o f  the luxurious palace resort, lounge entertaimnent, show tickets, cocktails, a buffet 
dinner, a bottle o f  the Dunes Gold Label Champagne, and free limousine service. 
Tourists wanting a room paid $8 more per night on weekdays, and $ 13 more during 
weekends and holidays." The existing Dimes model was important, because it 
convinced Bayley that operating his own airline was feasible.
Once Bayley’s service began, he wasted little time in appointing Henry Price as 
manager o f  Hacienda’s flight division to oversee flight operations. Like the Dunes, 
Bayley began with one airplane when he leased a DC-3. Increasing passenger traffic 
soon convinced Price to urge Bayley to buy a larger airplane and abandon leasing.
Bayley purchased a DC-4, and spent $95,000 to completely refurbish it with comfortable 
seats and a piano bar.' ' He even provided entertainment en route. Bayley hired Dick 
Winslow, a  former Hollywood actor, as his in-flight entertainer. Winslow, who played 
tunes and sang popular songs during the flights, conceded that his music was secondary 
to his primary responsibility; calming nervous passengers who had never flown before - - 
a common problem in the 1960s." Other “shows” on these flights included young, 
attractive women modeling fashions for the passengers. Contrary to rumor and claims in 
the Green F elt Jungle that these ladies performed a striptease, they actually never did, 
although they wore lingerie that was risqué for the tim e."
For $27.50, a Hacienda Airlines passenger received $5 in chips, a  buffet dinner, a 
bottle o f  champagne, membership to a  golf course lit at night (where each guest had a 
chance to win $5,000 for a hole-in-one), a ticket for the show at the New Frontier (a 
resort which Bayley had earlier purchased a 90 percent share), and limousine service. 
Guests also received a  tote bag with the Hacienda logo as a souvenir o f  their experience. 
While at the hotel, guests also enjoyed complimentary glasses o f  champagne. If  a guest
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wanted to stay overnight, they paid $35.50; weekend packages cost $9 m ore." Those 
traveling on long-distance flights could stay five or six days with the same amenities for 
$188.50."
Bayley offered low fares, and he frequently advertised his airline in Los Angeles 
newspapers and on highway billboards. His innovative management team even came up 
with the idea o f  printing flight schedules on the inside o f matchbook covers that were 
dispensed from cigarette vending machines all across the West. This gimmick was an 
ingenious promotion tactic. Thanks to innovative advertising, Bayley’s carrier booked 
thousands o f  gamblers into Las Vegas."
The resort’s flight schedule and range o f  destinations was impressive. Hacienda 
Airlines offered daily flights from Los Angeles, Long Beach, Santa Ana, Burbank, San 
Francisco, and San Diego to Las Vegas using DC-3s and Constellations. Longer-range 
flights from Dallas, St. Louis, Chicago, New York, Detroit, and Honolulu required use o f 
Bayley’s DC-4 and Constellations. In a 2000 interview, Boyd Michael, Hacienda Chief 
Pilot and Director o f  Pilot Training, outlined a typical weekly crew schedule to 
demonstrate the size o f Bayley’s operation and ominously, how it competed with the 
major airlines in many o f the same cities. He recalled that on a Friday afternoon a  DC-4 
crew would leave Burbank Airport for Las Vegas, continue to St. Louis, and terminate in 
Chicago. The crew had a layover on Saturday, and then on Sunday would leave with a 
partial load from Chicago to St. Louis, where they would load more passengers before 
heading to Las Vegas for even more passengers before terminating in Honolulu. For the 
DC-3 junket flights, a  crew would leave Long Beach Airport and fly to Los Angeles, then 
Burbank before landing in Las Vegas. Constellation crews flew primarily from Las 
Vegas to St. Louis, Detroit, Chicago, New York, Dallas, and Honolulu. The airline also 
operated flights from San Francisco to Las Vegas twice weekly. According to Michael, a 
DC-3 crew flew five roundtrips per day between San Francisco and Las Vegas. By 1961, 
Hacienda Airlines ran seventy flights a  w eek ."
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Bayley soon found himself the owner o f  a sizable airline. In 1962, the appraised 
value o f his fleet was between SI and $2 m illion." Earlier, in 1961, Bayley had 
purchased 25 additional Constellations from TWA. The transaction also included thirty- 
eight extra engines, twenty-five extra propellers, and S3.5 million worth o f  spare parts 
and tools. At that time, it was the largest purchase by any air service operator in Nevada 
history and would have put the value o f  his fleet much higher." But because o f  growing 
financial difficulties related to problems with the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), he 
never took delivery o f  those Constellations. Had he done so, his fleet would have 
exceeded 30 airplanes and his service would have more than tripled the capacity o f the 
hotel’s guest capability. In addition to purchasing these planes, Bayley paid S35 million 
for six jets including a Boeing 707 from TWA. One Convair 880 and the Boeing 707 
were scheduled for delivery in April 1962.“  He intended to use these aircraft for nonstop 
service from Las Vegas to Honolulu, New York, (Zhicago, and Miami. But once again, 
because o f Bayley’s problems with the CAB, these jets never appeared on the flight line.
Bayley’s only maintenance base for his aircraft was at Long Beach Air Terminal 
where a staff o f  62 mechanics tended to his fleet. He wanted to move his entire operation 
to Las Vegas, but his fear o f  prompting a lawsuit or complaint from the commercial 
airlines discouraged him from doing so. Had Bayley moved to the casino city, his 
reduced operating costs would have allowed him to fly even more passengers from 
Southern California and the East to southern Nevada. The move also would have 
pumped an estimated $520,000 into Southern Nevada’s economy annually from the 
maintenance payroll alone, hi addition, Bayley would have contributed another $1.5 
million in payrolls for his flight crews.^'
Despite its contribution to Las Vegas tourism and profitability. Hacienda Airlines 
faced an uncertain future. In 1960, Hacienda Airlines delivered more than 70,000 
passengers to McCarran Airport with projections for 120,000 in 1961.“  The 
success o f  Bayley’s enterprise, however, spariced much growing resentment among the
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commercial airlines. His bargains drew so much traffic to his airline that it prompted 
TWA, United, and other commercial airlines serving Las Vegas to file numerous 
complaints with the CAB, accusing Bayley o f engaging in unfair competition. In 1960, 
they filed a formal complaint with the CAB also claiming that Bayley’s airline was 
operating without a  certificate.^ United, TWA, and the others also filed a complaint in 
1960 against the Dunes, which offered free flights in its DC-3. The complaint alleged 
that the Dunes’ operation also lacked a certificate. In 1961, after CAB pressure, the 
Dunes canceled its air service to avoid expensive litigation. Hacienda Airlines became 
the next CAB target.
A year and a  half after Bayley began his airline, on August 12, 1960, the CAB 
issued an order to close it down. CAB examiner Richard W alsh’s investigation 
concluded that Bayley’s carrier violated the Federal Aviation Act by operating “package 
tours” without an operations certificate." Hacienda General Manager Richard Taylor 
countered by arguing that the airline ’’provided air transportation fiee o f  charge solely for 
guests o f  the Hacienda in Las Vegas and thus was not engaged in carrying passengers for 
compensation or hire and did not need a certificate.”"  Hacienda attorneys filed 
numerous appeals and even obtained a federal injunction on May 5, 1961, which blocked 
the CAB fiom enacting and enforcing its order. The court allowed the airline to operate 
its long-range flights under Federal Aviation Regulations Part 42, which permitted ten 
flights a month from any city in the United States to Las V egas." This order decreased 
the number o f  the airline’s long-range flights, but still allowed it to continue normal 
flights.
Hacienda Airlines executives and attorneys reemphasized to CAB officials that 
their airline did not require a certificate because it was a  charter service and not a 
scheduled airline. However, the CAB insisted that because the carrier operated like a 
commercial airline with a flight schedule and charged customers money for package 
deals, it needed an operating certificate. So, after the agency rejected their argument.
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Hacienda attorneys filed a second application for a  certificate (Bayley had filed a 
previous application, which the CAB had not reviewed). Later, the lawyers conceded 
that when the airline began in 1959, for a  brief time, customers bought tickets, but once 
the Hacienda offered package deals, passengers no longer had to buy tickets. They 
essentially flew for fice. The package amount that they paid was equal to the value o f  an 
airplane ticket.
O f course, there was another powerful argument against the federal government 
using its regulatory power to shut down this business. As Taylor observed, the Hacienda 
generated a tremendous amount o f new business for Las Vegas - a  point that the resort’s 
attorneys and promoters emphasized. Taylor also stressed that the airlines showed 
consistent increases in passenger volum e." Hacienda attorney John Preston Jr. asserted 
that the operation was not “for hire” and was only a “business promotional 
device.”"  But, the commercial airlines’ opposition continued. On June 6, 1961, 
Hacienda Airlines was forced to deplane and enplane its entire fleet at the Las Vegas 
Airmotive Terminal (at the old McCarran Field) because o f  complaints by Bonanza 
Airlines that “the ramps were getting overcrowded for the commercial airlines
In the end, the CAB sided with the airlines. CAB attorney Robert Toomey again 
argued that the Hacienda operated illegally without a certificate and cautioned that other 
resorts would follow suit if  allowed to do so. He asserted that an increase in competition 
would be detrimental to the commercial airlines. Toomey recalled in 1960 how the CAB 
“adopted its examiner’s findings that Las Vegas Hacienda hic., and Henry Price, 
manager o f  Hacienda’s Flight Division had operated as a common carrier for 
compensation between California and Las Vegas without CAB authority in violation o f  
the Federal Aviation Act.”"
As the CAB intensified its pressure on Bayley, his resort competitors did little to 
support him. Despite the increased tourism that Bayley’s carrier awarded Las Vegas, the 
other resorts in town overwhelmingly supported the CAB’s decision. One anonymous
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casino executive poignantly asked; “What incentive will the airlines have to boost Las 
Vegas when we fly a minimum o f three thousand passengers a month for free?” He 
further cautioned that “we are also going to be in trouble if  we couple booze with 
gambling and gimmick-style promotions and toss in $S for lure.... That puts us in a class 
o f ‘Sin City USA,’ an identification we have successfully avoided for five years.”^' The 
Strip hotels opposed any changes affecting their traditional practice o f  catering to opulent 
customers. In fact, they even opposed new CAB-sanctioned competition.
As a result o f concerted pressure from commercial airline attorneys and growing 
criticism from Strip hotels and local newspapers, lawyers for the CAB went to a 
California Court of Appeals seeking an order to permanently shutdown Hacienda 
Airlines. On January 17, 1962, they emerged victorious, but the Hacienda immediately 
appealed to the California Supreme Court. Taylor predicted that his operation would 
continue, because, as he put it, the courts would recognize “that the CAB was influenced 
by major airlines” and that Hacienda Airlines was not violating the law ."  However, on 
May 21, 1962, the Supreme Court justices upheld the lower court’s decision and ruled 
that “the Hacienda program, while different, still required a Certificate o f  Convenience 
and Necessity.”^̂  On May 26, the Hacienda once again appealed to the court, but the 
justices reaffirmed their decision and ordered the Hacienda to cease operations by July 
10.
This represented a major defeat for Bayley. In an address to company employees, 
he reported that although it was the hotel’s position that Hacienda Airlines did not require 
an operating certificate, an application for one had been filed by the hotel with the CAB 
since 1960, but after two and a half years, it was still pending. He also expressed his 
concern that the loss o f his airline could damage his resort’s business. “Unless we find 
relief in some manner,” he warned, “the effect on the hotel will be unknown as we have 
had flight customers from the beginning, and therefore have no yardstick by which to 
measure business after our flights are curtailed.”"
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W hile one might expect that at least some Las Vegas resort owners would finally 
unite around Bayley, this was not the case. Instead, they continued to support TWA, 
American, and the other commercial airlines. Specifically, the resort community 
criticized Bayley for targeting moderate and lower-income customers rather than high 
rollers. Las Vegas hotel executives contended that wealthy people traditionally spent 
more money gambling and were more representative o f  the type o f  image the resorts 
should promote. This criticism echoed loudly in the local newspapers where columnists 
such as Paul Price criticized Bayley for not catering to wealthy gamblers, and argued that 
as a result o f  these “free flights,” commercial airlines would lack incentive to expand 
their fleets and markets and any new airlines serving Las Vegas would follow suit.^^
Price sharply criticized Bayley for blatantly disregarding the damaging effects that his 
junket airline had on conunercial service by slowing its development and growth.
In retrospect, Taylor noted that as a result o f the widespread success o f  Hacienda 
Airlines and its parent hotel, few Strip resorts liked Bayley’s “new ideas” and pressured 
him to shut down his airline and cancel the “Hacienda Holiday But, Bayley purposely 
avoided catering to the wealthy, Taylor explained, because he would have had to hire big 
name celebrities such as Frank Sinatra, Sammy Davis Jr., and others who would have 
demanded extravagant salaries in addition to receiving large commissions from their 
overpriced tickets. Bayley wanted his hotel rooms to be affordable and sought to 
promote a family atmosphere. He preferred that a moderate and lower-income clientele 
fly on his airline and enjoy themselves at his hotel without feeling pressured to spend 
exorbitant sums o f  money. Bayley felt that his hotel’s location at the beginning o f the 
Strip near the airport, would attract families heading north on the highway in their 
automobiles. The resort’s pool, go-cart track and other attractions would lure them in 
and the bargain prices would induce them to attend their stay. Obviously Bayley’s 
marketing strategy and maricet niche were remarkably different from those o f  his Strip 
competitors and may have threatened some o f  them.
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The Hacienda’s troubles did not end with the Supreme Court’s order to cease 
operations. In September 1962, Blatz and Standard, two Southern California airlines, 
faced disciplinary action from the CAB for operating flights to Nevada casinos, including 
the Hacienda, without CAB approval. Standard Chief Executive Officer Shields B. 
Craft’s airline had been charged with “taking part in various pooling and working 
agreements with the Hacienda Hotel, a resort hotel found to have operated an air service 
between Los Angeles and Las Vegas without CAB authority.”^̂  According to one 
newspaper. Standard had apparently violated regulations for several years. A Standard 
attorney denied that his airline did business with the Hacienda, though he later conceded 
that occasionally some o f the Hacienda pilots had been hired on just like other airline 
pilots.^' For their part, the commercial airlines charged that Standard wanted to convert 
its individual ticket service into a charter operation, which CAB regulations prohibited. 
The CAB charged Blatz with “repeatedly violating civil air regulations by failing to 
charge fares specified in its tariffs by providing service to persons to whom it had not 
sold tickets, and by operating flights without authority to several Nevada cities under 
arrangements with gambling casinos ” According to the CAB report, the airline had 
agreements with casinos to fly their patrons to Reno, Searchlight, Hawthorne, 
Winnemucca, and Tonopah.^’
The demise o f  the Hacienda Airlines pleased the commercial airlines, the Strip 
hotels, and the local press. The junket airline had been an unwanted competitor, 
especially for the commercial airlines. But, for the Hacienda management and hotel 
employees, it marked the end o f  a  spectacular operation that powered the hotel’s early 
success. The shutdown was briefly overshadowed on December 28, 1964, when Bayley 
collapsed in his office and died from a massive heart attack at the age o f  6 4 ."  Among 
those who attended his funeral were Governor Grant Sawyer, Senator Howard Cannon, 
and Hollywood actor Gene Autry. His death appeared in newspapers across the country. 
Richard Taylor remembered Ba>1^ as a  visionary and “one o f  the last ‘silver tongued’
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salesmen and promoters who was the backbone and the driving force that made the 
Hacienda a success.”^'
Bayley’s junket airline and his promotion o f  package deals laid the foundation for 
the jimket business to Las Vegas in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In addition, it served 
as a model for later hotel junkets offered by MGM, Hilton, Caesars Palace, and Circus 
Circus in association with both charters and commercial airlines. In fact, the business 
grew to such an extent in the 1970s and 1980s that in 1993, McCarran airport officials 
had to build a separate charter terminal to handle the increased passenger volume.
Today, one is overwhelmed by the myriad deals offered by airlines and hotels alike on 
the Internet and in travel sections o f  Sunday newspapers. Brochures announcing low 
airfares and inexpensive rooms regularly appear in travel magazines to entice tourists into 
booking a glamorous weekend trip to Las Vegas. Typical is American Airlines, which 
touts its “Fly AAway” travel packages to Las Vegas that include airfare, hotel 
accommodations, and meals for one reasonable price. Southwest, America West, United, 
and Las Vegas-based National Airlines also offer package deals from many cities in the 
United States.
But for all o f  their criticism o f  Doc Bayley and his airline in the early 1960s, both 
the commercial airlines and Las Vegas’ modem resorts later adopted his modus operandi 
o f  air travel to Las Vegas for moderate and low-income travelers. In some o f  Las 
Vegas’s efforts in recent years to promote itself as a family destination. Circus Circus, 
Excalibur, and other resorts that cater to the lower-end maricets are building upon a 
tradition that Warren Bayley helped establish at both his hotel and his airline almost a 
half century ago.
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CHAPTERS
A NEW  HORIZON: THE IMPACT OF 
DEREGULATION ON COMMERCIAL 
AIR TRAVEL IN LAS VEGAS
In 1938, the federal government invoked regulation on the airline industry 
following a congressional hearing addressing consumer complaints about safety, 
substandard service, and an overall lack o f  organization.' By establishing a well-defined 
set o f  rules for airlines to follow, the government hoped to restore public confidence in 
commercial air travel. As a result. Delta, United. TWA, and other commercial air 
carriers complied by restructuring their maintenance and safety programs as well as their 
operating procedures. They also improved the quality o f their in flight service, and 
occasionally lowered airfares to appease the traveling^ublic. Although the airlines made 
significant progress by implementing these changes, they still had to contend with other 
equally troublesome issues.
For years, commercial air carriers primarily flew to large cities, inconveniencing 
customers by requiring them to drive long distances. Also, because regulation limited the 
number o f  airlines serving relatively few destinations nationwide, some air carriers 
dominated certain markets, especially at hub airports such as Denver, Chicago, and St. 
Louis. As a result, they were able to establish their own fares, making air travel 
unaffordable for many Americans. Although regulation prevented airlines from charging 
customers unreasonably high prices and mandated federal approval for any airfare 
changes, still only those customers who could afford them, flew. But after World W ar II,
36
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when Americans enjoyed more disposable income and vacation time, their travel interests 
increased and as a result, airlines had much difficulty meeting the demand.
Consequently, many air carriers had to lease larger and more efficient airplanes to replace 
the smaller and less economic ones. Common commercial airline propeller-driven 
aircraft, such as the Constellation and Douglas DC-3, gave way in the 1960s to jets like 
the Boeing 727 and Douglas DC-9, which had longer fuel ranges, flew at faster speeds, 
and reduced travel time by at least fifty percent. Soon, those je ts were replaced by more 
efficient ones such as the Boeing 737 (for short-hauls), and the wide-bodied Douglas DC- 
10 and Boeing 747, which could transport dozens more passengers longer distances, at a 
lower cost per passenger mile. But, operating these aircraft proved to be expensive, and 
as a result, airlines raised fares, which quickly ended the surge. Thus, in order to 
stimulate demand, in the mid 1960s, airlines had to reduce their fares by as much as SO 
percent.’ Once again, customers took advantage o f  the low prices, and the passenger 
volume soared. This was the trend throughout the 1960s and much o f  the 1970s. But, 
Congress realized that the airline industry needed change that would end these market 
fluctuations and provide maricet stability. The only way to accomplish this was to 
increase competition. One government report confirmed that “Congress was convinced 
that increased competition would benefit the airlines and the public.”’
ha October 1978, Congress passed the Airline Deregulation Act, which 
revolutionized the airline industry. After forty years o f  federal oversight, the law 
suddenly gave airlines the freedom “to decide where they would fly and what fares they 
would charge.”  ̂ It also opened new markets, allowing airlines access to the abimdance 
o f passengers in second and third-tier cities never served before by any commercial air 
carrier. Customers no longer had to drive to larger cities to catch their flights, a  practice 
which frequently discouraged many from flying. Deregulation also allowed new air 
carriers to penetrate established markets and undercut their competitors by offering lower 
far^ .
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Deregulation initially created chaos in the industry. Some carriers like Pan Am 
and Eastern went bankrupt. Others, like United, Delta, and American thrived by 
obtaining more gates by purchasing more jets or by acquiring or merging with regional 
and new carriers. In some places like Mirmeapolis, one airline nearly monopolized the 
airport, but in other cities this was not the case. As TWA Las Vegas Station Manager 
Duane Busch explained, there was a “massive explosion [in passenger volume] and many 
airlines just could not handle it.”'  But, unlike many o f  these larger cities where major 
airlines nearly monopolized the airports. Las Vegas was unique.
Just a year and a half after deregulation, the number o f commercial airlines 
serving Las Vegas had increased from seven to seventeen. Many new air carriers jumped 
at the opportunity to enter the lucrative southern Nevada market. By offering low fares, 
they hoped to attract many middle and lower-income customers, a market whose value 
had been demonstrated by Doc Bayley’s Hacienda Airlines. While some political leaders 
and casino executives worried about using the airport to target low-income passengers, 
there was little they could do but adjust. And they did. Circus Circus and Excalibur 
pioneered the new low-income maricet niche o f  the 1980s and 1990s. Together, the 
airlines and Strip hotels began to tap a market that Fremont Street and the bus companies, 
as well as Doc Bayley and William J. Moore, had exploited for years.
Because so many tourists in the 1980s and 1990s booked flights on airlines such 
as Southwest, America West, Reno Air, United, and United Express, Las Vegas became a 
low-yield maricet for the leisure traveler as a result o f  competition and discounted 
airfares. At the same time, the city embraced another profitable maricet, business travel. 
According to recent statistics, over ten percent o f  the Las Vegas market accounted for 
business travelers and locals.' For Southwest and some other commercial air carriers, 
both markets proved to be quite profitable, but for others, they were not. Take the case o f 
TWA, which offered eleven daily flights from Las Vegas in the 1970s, but reduced its 
flights in the 1980s because it found international markets and domestic long-range
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routes, such as those from San Francisco to JFK, to be much more profitable. This was 
especially true for TWA, whose fleet consisted mostly o f wide-body Lockheed L-101 Is 
and 747s, which could carry more than 300 passengers.’ Other airlines including Delta 
and American also followed suit, but unlike Trans World, they maintained their same 
number o f flights serving Las Vegas before deregulation. United even increased its 
flights, because it was one o f  the largest airlines in the world and its sheer volume o f 
business allowed it to absorb low profits in the Las Vegas market.'
By the late 1980s, with McCarran’s passenger volume surpassing 17 million and 
mega-resorts sprouting along the Strip, Las Vegas became an even more attractive venue 
for tourists. This proved even more true in the 1990s when the passenger volume 
doubled and more mega-resorts appeared. With more seats available, airlines watched 
their flight loads significantly rise and resort hotel owners saw their rooms fill up.
Thanks to their discount packages, the airlines helped to reinforce this trend. Western 
Airlines, for instance, offered its “Las Vegas Bonus” fare where customers flew round 
trip from Los Angeles to Las Vegas for $54 (with restrictions).’ Other airlines also 
offered similar fares and cheap package deals that attracted thousands o f customers. 
Southwest and America West Airlines, for instance, began serving Las Vegas in the early 
1980s, and they quickly dominated the market by offering competitive fares just as 
Western and Hughes AirWest had done in the 1970s. But, the new companies employed 
different marketing strategies.
Known as an airline with “no frills,” Southwest immediately challenged the 
dominance o f  America West, United, Delta, and the other air carriers serving McCarran. 
According to Susan Davis, a  sales representative for Southwest, the airline catered to all 
customers without targeting any specific class. By offering two for the price o f  one fares, 
and bonus rewards for the number o f  trips flown. Southwest developed a large and broad 
clientele." W ith 169 daily departures and arrivals (soon to be over 200, which will allow 
Las Vegas to surpass Phoenix as the most popular destination within the Southwest
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system), the airline with the motto “fun, low fares, and frequency,” amassed large profits 
from the Las Vegas market. Davis points out that the airline “tried to target young 
minded’ travelers, but catered to all passengers. .. So there really was no specific focus 
on any type o f  passenger.” "  The airline also strategically focused on a “short haul ” 
market where the average flight did not exceed a 500 mile radius nor a flight time o f 
more than one hour. It was also careful to protect its interests by refusing to enter the 
reservation systems o f  the major carriers, helping to save it from the experience o f  Pan 
Am and Braniff, which saw many of their reservations pirated by  airlines that controlled 
the system. Southwest also prided itself on entertaining its customers while en route and 
promoted vacation-type destinations. In addition, the airline innovated many methods for 
rapid turnarounds, deplaning and enplaning passengers in as little as 15 minutes by not 
assigning seats. Southwest’s popularity among tourists eventually made it the sole tenant 
at McCarran’s “C” Concourse by the late 1990s (an unintentional result o f  other airlines 
occupying the “D” Gates).
In contrast, America West attempted to focus on the business traveler. As the 
airline’s marketing manager Jennifer Myers noted, “because the airline catered to the 
business traveler, it provided more flights in certain markets that proved to be more 
profitable.”"  To accomplish this, America West scheduled a majority o f  its flights to 
depart from Los Angeles, Phoenix, Las Vegas, and San Francisco, so business travelers 
could easily make connecting flights to eastern destinations. Myers explained 
that “the airline had a complex system, more so than passengers ju st flying to Las Vegas 
to stay there. .. Las Vegas was primarily a connecting airport for a  majority o f  America 
W est’s older passengers.”"  The airline also created a niche by scheduling many o f  its 
flights in the evening and late at night (“red-eye flights”), because those times proved to 
be the most profitable. However, i f  the business passenger market proved to be more 
profitable than the leisure traveler one, the airline began scheduling more day flights to 
accommodate the business traveler. "  According to Myers, America West’s strategy was
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to observe a geographic region to see which airline was the most dominant and what their 
strategy was. America West would then move in and offer competitive fares and provide 
amenities that the other carriers did not provide in order to capture the lion's share o f  the 
market.
Adopting a similar philosophy to that o f  America West was Michael Conway, 
C hief Executive Officer o f  National Airlines, Las Vegas’s “hometown airline,” which 
also catered to the business traveler, but in a different market. By offering inexpensive 
transcontinental flights from Las Vegas to eastern United States cities such as 
Philadelphia, Chicago, and New Yoric, Conway believed that he would attract more 
business travelers (and tourists) than his competitors. For instance, passengers could fly 
round trip on National from Las Vegas to Miami for $238." Because Las Vegas was 
such a popular destination for air travelers and a city that attracted more businesses, 
Conway felt that it was the ideal base for his airline. He contended that “for a true hub- 
and-spoke market to be successful, the hub o f  the operation must be a strong destination 
in and o f  itself.” "  Also, by using one type o f  aircraft like Southwest, he kept the airline’s 
maintenance to a minimum.
But, the air carrier quickly went into the red after its first year and a half in 
business. Aside from opening on a later date than projected, rising fuel prices consumed 
much o f  the airline’s capital. In fact it accounted for over forty percent o f  the air carrier’s 
operating expenses. Other airlines also felt the sting from high oil prices. On a similar 
note, part o f  Conway’s operation included flights from San Francisco and Los Angeles to 
Las Vegas, short-haul routes that were not economically sensible for Boeing 757s. With 
massive debt and insufficient capital from financial backers to support the airline. 
National officials filed for bankruptcy in 2000.
O f course, commercial airlines were not the only carriers affected by 
deregulation. Years before the historic passage o f  that legislation, the Frontier and 
Hacienda hotels enjoyed business from customers arriving on charter flights. In the
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1960s and 1970s, United Airlines was the leading commercial air carrier offering charter 
flights to Las Vegas. Using DC-8s with seating capacities ranging from 127 to 184 seats 
(the airline later used wide-bodied DC-10s with seating capacities exceeding 300), in 
1977, the airline transported over 55,000 passengers o f  all types to Las Vegas. In fact, 
seven years earlier, the airline built its own charter terminal on the far east side o f 
McCarran A irport." After deregulation. United found itself competing with dozens o f 
other charter air carriers, including Sun Country and America Trans Air, which also flew 
wide-body aircraft to Las Vegas from munerous cities across the nation. This dramatic 
revolution stemmed from deregulation, which permitted charter airlines to fly many o f 
the same routes as the scheduled commercial airlines. As a result, McCarran Airport 
planners and managers had to alter their expansion plans to allow for construction o f  a 
separate charter terminal as well as more passenger gates to handle the increased volume 
o f  charter and regular passengers.
Like the je t in the 1960s, deregulation in 1978 changed the entire commercial air 
travel industry. For forty years, the CAB had regulated destinations served by airlines, 
often spawning heated court battles as the air carriers fought for the most lucrative 
maricets. By invoking regulation, the federal government prevented unfair competition 
and kept any outside carriers from entering markets served by commercial air carriers. It 
also contended that regulation would “alleviate Congressional concern over safety and an 
airline’s financial health... because many o f  them were near bankruptcy and service was 
often unreliable.”"  Thus, the federal government firmly believed that regulation was 
appropriate for the airline industry. The airlines also supported regulation because it kept 
out unwanted competition, thus allowing United, TWA, and other carriers to control 
certain markets.
By 1999, air travel had become the most popular mode o f  transportation for 
tourists to southern Nevada. It is “the lifeblood o f  Las Vegas, ” claims Busch. “Without 
it, the city would not enjoy even half o f  the revenue that tourists bring.” But the golden
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age o f air travel to Las Vegas really began in the 1990s when the passenger volume 
skyrocketed. Between 1980 and 1990, it doubled 6om  10 million to 20 million. Six 
years later, it surpassed 30 million and will undoubtedly hit 40 million by 2002 or 2003. 
With continued improvements in aircraft technology, including larger and more efficient 
planes, the passenger volume at McCarran will increase as long as the themed mega­
resorts built by entrepreneurs Steve Wynn, Kirk Kerkorian, Sheldon Adelson, and others, 
continue to draw tourists.
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CHAPTER 4
A NEW LANDSCAPE: MEGA-RESORTS.
TOURISM, AND FREQUENT FLYERS
With an expanding passenger volume, and explosive population growth in the Las 
Vegas Valley primarily as a result o f  mega-resorts appearing along the Strip in the late 
1980s and 1990s, Las Vegas quickly entered a new age. Having earned a reputation as a 
city filled with crime, corruption, and vice, especially in the second half o f  the twentieth 
century. Las Vegas finally rid itself o f  its infamous past and became a city dedicated to 
serving tourists and residents o f  lower, middle, and upper classes. Historian Hal 
Rothman points out that “only a generation ago, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Las 
Vegas retained its stigma as a sleazy home o f tawdry sex and mobsters....Cleaned up. Las 
Vegas was what we [Las Vegans] wanted it to become.” ' This “new” Las Vegas not 
only emerged as a modem gambler’s paradise with high-tech gaming venues, but also as 
a resort town with themed attractions and entertainment for tourists, families, and city 
residents. Former Washington Post journalist Pete Earley announced in a 2000 
publication that “the ‘old’ Las Vegas was dead and a new’ Las Vegas had risen.”" He 
was right.
In the late 1980s and 1990s, Las Vegas joined Miami, Orlando, and Phoenix, as 
resort cities which experienced unprecedented population growth largely because o f 
tourism. However, Las Vegas was unique in that it experienced such remarkable growth 
in a shorter period o f  time. As Rothman explains, “while Las Vegas became the fastest 
growing city in the nation during the 1990s, its population doubled and then nearly
45
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doubled again as its physical expanse exploded all over the desert.” ' Contributing to this 
remarkable growth were the thousands o f  tourists who daily passed through McCarran's 
gates, and hundreds o f  others who crowded sidewalks, filled the casinos, shopped in 
upscale stores, and dined in gourmet restaurants showcasing a variety o f  international 
cuisines. During this period, the town wimessed nothing short o f  a transformation, as 
Las Vegas reinvented itself again, thanks to mega-resort entrepreneurs Steve Wynn, Kirk 
Kerkorian, Barron Hilton, and others. These hotel icons began a popular trend that 
permanently changed Las Vegas from the small “resort town in the desert,” it had been 
for years into a booming international destination.
Since the late 1940s, Strip hotels attracted thousands o f  tourists by simply 
appealing to those who wanted to try their luck at the gaming tables. Aside from the Del 
Webbs and the Thomas Hulls, organized crime figures also owned many o f these 
properties, and they made millions by creating relatively small, but elegantly decorated 
casinos with cheap shows, comped drinks, nicely appointed rooms, and a pool that added 
to the lure. However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, control o f  these resort hotels 
gradually changed hands when large corporations came to town and bought them up. 
Prior to the revision o f  the Corporate Gaming Act in 1969, new casino owners routinely 
underwent investigation by the Nevada Gaming Commission before they were issued a 
gaming license. The purpose o f this process was to limit the number o f  corporations 
entering the gaming industry and preventing them from controlling it."* However, once 
the act was passed in 1969, the corporate presence in Las Vegas increased because only 
key casino executives were investigated. This dramatically changed the entire gaming 
and hotel industry on the Strip as it increasingly came under corporate control.
In the 1970s and 1980s hotel icons such as Kirk Kerkorian, Barron Hilton and 
others transformed the Strip by building enormous high-rise structures containing 
thousands o f  rooms, large casinos, and a plethora o f  fine dining and entertainment
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options. Though a large number o f  smaller properties had already been established, these 
magnificent structures quickly dominated the hotel industry in Las Vegas because they 
drew such large crowds with their amenities and features. But the Strip would grow even 
larger. In the late 1980s and 1990s, that trend changed when these properties gave way to 
enormous, billion-dollar mega-resorts that drew more crowds, heavily contributed to a 
population explosion, and completely changed the resort hotel industry.
In 1989, mega-resort pioneer Steve Wyim’s Mirage inaugurated this new trend. 
Four years later, Kerkorian, who sold his MGM Grand Hotel to Bally’s in 1984, and left 
town for several years before returning, built a new 5,000 room MGM Grand to 
challenge Wyim’s Mirage. In the meantime, William Bennett, owner o f  Circus Circus 
Hotel (he and an associate had purchased it from Jay Samo in 1974), a  lower-end 
property, built a more elegant resort for guests, the 4,100 room Excalibur, which opened 
in 1990. Circus Circus followed this up with the middle-income Luxor in 1993, and 
finally the company’s upscale resort, the Mandalay Bay, six years later. These and other 
themed resorts attracted millions o f  tourists, over 46% o f  whom flew to Las Vegas in 
1999 on commercial and charter flights.^
Indeed, the hotels and commercial airlines have enjoyed a symbiotic relationship 
for decades, and it has only grown with time. In 1989, Las Vegas hotels reported an 
89.8% occupancy rate and just over 17 million air travelers passed through McCarran’s 
gates. In 1993, the number o f  hotel guests increased by three percent and the passenger 
volume increased to over 22 million.^ Certainly this growth can be partly attributed to 
more mega-resorts appearing along the Strip. In a recent interview, McCarran Airport 
Director Randall Walker agreed that tlie airlines enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with 
hotels. He explained how each hotel room generated approximately 350 passengers 
annually, and he expected that number to remain the same or increase so long as 
McCarran continued to feed large numbers o f  tourists to The Mirage, Caesars Palace,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
48
Bellagio, and other mega-resorts. But, as this study shows, whenever the Strip hotels 
added more rooms, the airport had to expand, and this remained the case into the twenty- 
first century.
In January 1980, when TRA received the contract for airport expansion, it 
planned for a facility that would accommodate 20 million passengers by 2000. The first 
phase o f  “McCarran 2000,” the most elaborate and expensive airport expansion plan in 
the city’s history to date, included terminal expansion by 1.5 million square-feet for 12 
baggage claim carousels and 18 gates. It also called for an expanded parking structure 
with 1,500 more parking spaces, new cargo facilities, an enlarged air traffic control 
tower, and an elaborate airport roadway extension program that included a connection to 
a freeway (Interstate 215). All o f  this cost the airport S287 million, a price far exceeding 
initial projections. Fortunately, tax exempt bonds paid for the project, supplemented by 
landing fees, passenger facility charges, retail rental space, and parking and slot machine 
revenue.* But, the project’s cost was not the only problem. Statisticians predicted that 
McCarran would reach 20 million passengers by 2000, but the airport reached that 
milestone in 1990! Because the planners greatly underestimated the increase in tourist 
volume, phases two and three o f  “McCarran 2000” had to begin immediately.
Those plans called for more airline ticket and rental car counter space, an 
expanded baggage claim area, and an enlarged parking structure to nine stories with the 
capacity to accommodate 6,500 automobiles and commercial vehicles (in addition to a 
remote parking site for overflow). The plans also included construction o f  two more 
satellite concourses, the “C” gates for Southwest Airlines, and “D” gates for United, 
American, Delta, and other airlines. Planners also wanted to build an international 
terminal with eight gates for use by Japan Airlines, Mexicana, Canadian, Air Canada, and 
other international carriers. With many o f these foreign airlines flying wide-body 
aircraft to McCarran, especially Boeing 767s and DC-1 Os, the airport needed to lengthen
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and reinforce its existing runways and build a third one paralleling the north-south 
runway 1-19 (completed in 1988), as well as a fourth paralleling the east-west runway 7- 
25 (completed in 1991 and extended in 1997)."
Airport plaimers and officials hoped that these additional facilities would be 
sufficient until plans could be drawn for a comprehensive expansion plan in the twenty- 
first century. Fortunately, the “D” concourse provided 26 more gates, enough to relieve 
commercial aircraft from having to wait for an available gate. Also it allowed space for 
more concessions, stores, restaurants, slot machines, and other revenue producers.
The airport also financially benefited from the Foreign Trade Zone (FTZ), which 
allowed international importers duty-fi*ee storage and assembly o f  foreign products. It 
also “provided substantial savings on duties, fees, and excise taxes.” '" Though some 
critics viewed this as potentially scandalous, the FTZ was not only beneficial to the 
airport, but also the city in that it helped diversify the metropolitan area’s economy and 
benefited the resorts by easing the pressure to raise gaming taxes. More importantly, the 
FTZ stimulated free trade, increased cargo business, and enticed businesses such as 
Douglas Aircraft, Levi Strauss, Service Merchandise, and other import companies to 
move their headquarters to Las Vegas." But once again, rapid growth created space 
problems. Despite the airport plans for enlarged FTZ facilities, they were still 
inadequate. By the late 1990s, officials realized that further expansion would be 
necessary as the passenger volume steadily surged toward McCarran’s maximum 
capacity o f  55 million travelers.
In 1999, planners conducted a study and concluded that the construction o f  a 
second major airport would be necessary to alleviate McCarran’s air traffic and terminal 
congestion problems. In a letter to the Chairman on the House Transportation and 
Infrastructure Subcommittee on Aviation, Randall Walker clearly showed the airport’s 
desperate need for additional land. He explained that there were over 550,000 aircraft
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operations annually in an airport whose maximum capacity was 705.000. a figure that 
would be easily reached by 2010. Walker then estimated that without expansion, the 
average flight would be delayed by at least 20 minutes, costing commercial and charter 
air carriers over $ 1,000 per delayed flight.'" Because Las Vegas was a low-yield market, 
he feared that the added expense might discourage airlines from offering more flights to 
Las Vegas and encourage them to seek more profitable markets. Walker also observed 
that the airport had already reached its 2,400 acre capacity with only enough room for 
“short and mid-term growth.” '^ He noted that during peak periods. Las Vegas air traffic 
controllers handled over 120 hourly arrivals and departures, and any additional flights 
would saturate the system.
In 2001. with federal funds becoming available for a new airport near Ivanpah 
and the help o f  influential Nevada senators Harry Reid and John Ensign, airport officials 
devised a new plan to secure additional monies for McCarran to alleviate its congestion, 
and prepare the facility to handle its maximum capacity. The centerpiece o f  “Vision 
2020” is a new airport south o f  Las Vegas. Despite opposition from environmentalists 
who argued that arrival and departure routes crossing over the Mojave National Preserve 
would cause excessive damage (which an extensive SI million airport planning study 
proved wrong), the county received approval from the federal government to purchase 
6,500 acres o f  land (30 miles south o f  the Las Vegas Valley) from the Bureau o f  Land 
Management for SI 3 million. When construction o f  the new airport is complete, it will 
handle cargo and international flights, in addition to overflow o f  scheduled commercial 
flights to McCarran. Dennis Mewshaw, planning manager for Clark County Department 
o f  Aviation, estimates that two to four million passengers will pass through the new 
airport’s gates by the end o f  its first year in operation. The first phase o f  construction, 
which is slated to begin in 2005, includes a  terminal building, two runways, and surface 
parking at a  price tag o f  SI billion.''*
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In addition to the new facility in Ivanpah, other stages o f  the plan include more 
airline ticket counter space and baggage claim carousels at McCarran's main terminal. A 
third wing will be added to the “D” Concourse (which will provide eleven more gates), 
and construction o f  a third terminal (including its own parking garage, ticket counters, 
and baggage claim facilities) with fourteen gates, eight o f  which will be reserved for 
international air carrier use. The airport will also build an o ff site 80,000 square-foot 
facility for all rental car companies (to make space available for the new baggage claim 
carousels), and a new control tower.
Future phases o f  the plan also include provisions for the improvement o f  other 
Clark County airports. To handle more private planes and air tour carrier services. North 
Las Vegas Airport will receive a third runway, a new apron, more hangar facilities, and a 
new air traffic control tower. Henderson Executive Airport will be funded for 
construction o f  a new terminal building, a second runway, a new apron, and more shade 
hangars.'" The plans also include construction o f  a fourth terminal at McCarran (where 
Signature Flight Support is currently located) providing ten more gates, and a fifth wing 
to be added to the “D” Concourse, which will provide nine more gates, allowing the 
airport to meet its goal o f  120 gates. Excluding the new airport, all o f  the additional 
expansion outlined in “Vision 2020” is estimated to cost $1.26 billion. According to 
Hilarie Grey, public affairs manager for the Department o f  Aviation, federal airport 
improvement funds and airport revenue will finance the project in addition to bond
17issues.
Airport officials and the County Commission desperately needed the land in 
Ivanpah. McCarran Airport had no further room for significant expansion o f  any kind. 
Had the federal government not approved the land purchase, the consequences would 
have been far reaching throughout southern Nevada. Without future passenger growth. 
Las Vegas’ economy would have plateaued. Because commercial air carriers bring so
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many tourists to town each year, without airport expansion to meet the demand, airport 
officials would have to limit the number o f  flights serving McCarran. which would 
seriously financially impact the airport, city, and hotels.
Had this happened, it would have been a disaster, because increased flights 
serving Las Vegas have gone hand in hand with the construction o f  the Mirage, second 
MGM Grand, Bellagio. the Venetian, Paris, and the other mega-resorts that have 
displaced their I950s-era predecessors on the Strip. Moreover, Steve Wyim’s impending 
reincarnation o f  the old Desert Inn will undoubtedly trigger a rippling effect across the 
entire north Strip. Already, Frontier Hotel officials are making plans to demolish that 
resort to make way for a spectacular successor. At the same time, the Boyd Group is 
pondering several options to prepare their Stardust property for the crowds that the 
Desert Inn’s water-themed venue will bring. In addition, the owners o f  the small arcades, 
restaurants, and shopping centers that separate these hotels from the Riviera, Circus 
Circus, and the Sahara are also preparing to demolish their buildings to provide land for 
one continuous line o f attractions that will finally allow the north Strip to challenge its 
southern competitor for tourist revenue. All projections indicate that, despite the threats 
o f  Indian casinos, Internet gambling, and fundamentalist Christian opposition. Las Vegas 
will continue to grow into the early decades o f  the twenty-first century. But if  the 
experiences o f  Reno and Atlantic City have taught Las Vegas’ leadership anything, it is 
that the presence o f  a modem, high-capacity jetport is the essential foimdation for a 
growing resort city.
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EPILOGUE
For decades, southern Nevada has heavily relied on tourism as its major source o f 
revenue. Since the early 1930s, millions o f  tourists and conventioneers came to the area, 
lured by Las Vegas’ continuing ability to reinvent itself. In the 1960s, the low-rise 
resorts o f  the postwar era gave rise to Caesars Palace, The International, and a new 
generation o f  plush hotels. Many o f these properties, in turn, were replaced in the 1980s 
and 1990s by the spectacular mega-resorts that have made the Strip an international 
destination, supported by the equally impressive expansion o f commercial air travel.
The latter played a pivotal role in southern Nevada’s tourist industry by annually 
transporting millions o f passengers to Las Vegas. In 1999, commercial and charter 
airplanes passed the automobile as the most popular means o f transportation to Las 
Vegas. Statistics also indicate that airlines were responsible for the sizable increase in 
the number o f guests occupying hotel rooms during the 1980s and early 1990s. Despite a 
slight decrease in the mid to late 1990s, overall room occupancy was up over the 
previous decade. In fact, projections from the Las Vegas Convention and Visitor’s 
Authority forecast this growth to continue well into the first half o f the twenty-first 
century. Surely McCarran’s passenger volume will certainly reach 40 million by 2001 or 
2002, and its maximum capacity o f  55 million within the next five years.
Thanks to improvements in aircraft technology, especially the je t engine, 
commercial airlines enjoyed a larger clientele. With speeds nearly twice those o f  their 
predecessors, je t aircraft cut travel time by at least half, hauled more passengers, and 
expanded air travel markets nationwide. Jets were especially useful for long-range 
flights, which made air travel accessible and affordable for easterners to fly to Las Vegas 
for business or pleasure.
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Before Atlantic City emerged in 1978 as a  competitor to Las Vegas, many 
Americans had never seen a casino. And while Atlantic City’s gambling revenues still 
remain higher, that city has not matched Las Vegas in entertainment, shopping, or mega- 
resorts, partially because it has no regularly scheduled airline flights, only charters. Other 
casino cities, such as Reno, have also suffered because o f limited airline service.
Following the recent merger between American Airlines and Reno Air (the carrier 
offering the most flights out o f Reno as well as between Reno and Las Vegas), the former 
totally ended all o f  its flights from Reno to Las Vegas. This awarded Southwest a 
stronghold in the market (with 12 daily flights) over America West and United (offering 
1 daily flight each). Even worse was American’s decision to end all service to Reno, 
which had a devastating impact on the city’s tourism. Lake Tahoe suffered as well from 
this decision. One o f the reasons for American’s action is that none o f  these casino cities 
have even approached the profitability that the Las Vegas markets offer commercial 
airlines. McCarran’s 800 daily arriving and departing flights bares clear testimony to this 
fact.
History clearly indicates that any significant cut in air travel would damage 
southern Nevada’s tourist industry, which, in turn, would cripple the region’s economy. 
This proved especially true after a devastating terrorist attack on the eastern United States 
forced the FAA to ground ail commercial flights nationwide. On September 11,2001, 
terrorists hijacked four commercial jets, using them as weapons to cause widespread 
destruction and death. Two o f  the jets, an American 767 and United 757, crashed into 
the upper floors o f World Trade Center in New York, causing both towers to catch fire. 
Within minutes, the two structures collapsed, resulting in the deaths o f  over 5,000 
workers. The third jet, an American 767, slammed into the west wing o f  the Pentagon, 
causing billions o f dollars in damage to the building, and claimed a total o f  189 lives.
The fourth jet, a  United 757, crashed just outside o f Pittsburgh, killing all 44 o f  the 
aircraft’s occupants.'
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The FAA’s grounding o f  ail commercial flights spawned a massive ripple-like 
effect across the country as thousands o f airplanes cluttered airports, millions of 
passengers were stranded, and airlines lost billions o f  dollars. Cargo businesses such as 
UPS, Fed Ex, and the United States Postal Service also experienced enormous financial 
setbacks. Las Vegas also felt the economic backlash o f  the FAA’s mandate, especially 
when thousands o f Strip hotel workers were laid o ff because the decline in tourism.
With the airlines groimded and not bringing any customers to Las Vegas, officials 
from Caesars Palace, Paris, Bellagio, and other mega-resorts, reported that within one 
week, room occupancy had declined by as much as 60%, and estimated gaming revenue 
losses to be in the tens o f millions. As a result, hotel executives ordered the laying off o f 
thousands o f employees. They also canceled shows because o f so few ticket sales.
Retail shops in the Forum, Desert Passage, and Showcase Mall reported enormous 
revenue losses. And taxicab companies laid off hundreds o f  drivers after business 
dropped by at least 50%. Las Vegas went into recession.^
After the FAA lifted their mandate on September 18, 2001, the airline and tourist 
industries in Las Vegas still have not ftilly recovered. Planes leave the gates with half of 
the passenger seats filled, despite the airlines’ desperate attempts to lure more customers 
by offering roimd-trip fares anywhere within the United States for less than $100. The 
Strip hotel room weekend occupancy rate has rebounded to 80%, but shows little sign o f 
reaching its 95% average anytime soon. Show ticket sales are up, but auditoriums still 
have many empty seats. Retail revenue is increasing, but sales are sluggish.^
The terrorist attack on September 11 clearly delineates the dependency o f tourists 
on commercial air travel to Las Vegas. Without air carrier service, tourism would 
decline so much, that it would indeed, damage the city’s economy. But, with airlines 
offering cheap fares, and the federal government taking appropriate measures to ensure 
safer skies for the traveling public, millions o f tourists will return to Las Vegas. Again 
the thunder will boom in the desert.
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